Diane Abbott - The Crisis of Masculinity

From the Institute of Arts and Letters:

With rapid economic and social change leaving Britain’s men behind, Labour politician Diane Abbott imagines brave solutions to an impending social disaster.

The Crisis of Masculinity

Michael Kimmel - Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era

 

Michael Kimmel's new book, Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era, has been getting a lot of attention on the interwebs. Salon posted an excerpt that focuses on the white supremacy morons as an example of the angriest of the angry white men. Over at the New York Times Sunday Book Review, Hanna Rosin (The End of Men) reviewed the book.

[As a side note, this is one of the best mainstream books of the year.]

The publisher's copy for the book is posted on the Amazon page for the book:

"[W]e can't come off as a bunch of angry white men.”
Robert Bennett, chairman of the Ohio Republican Party

One of the enduring legacies of the 2012 Presidential campaign was the demise of the white American male voter as a dominant force in the political landscape. On election night, after Obama was announced the winner, a distressed Bill O’Reilly lamented that he didn’t live in “a traditional America anymore.” He was joined by others who bellowed their grief on the talk radio airwaves, the traditional redoubt of angry white men. Why were they so angry? Sociologist Michael Kimmel, one of the leading writers on men and masculinity in the world today, has spent hundreds of hours in the company of America’s angry white men – from white supremacists to men's rights activists to young students –in pursuit of an answer. Angry White Men presents a comprehensive diagnosis of their fears, anxieties, and rage.

Kimmel locates this increase in anger in the seismic economic, social and political shifts that have so transformed the American landscape. Downward mobility, increased racial and gender equality, and a tenacious clinging to an anachronistic ideology of masculinity has left many men feeling betrayed and bewildered. Raised to expect unparalleled social and economic privilege, white men are suffering today from what Kimmel calls "aggrieved entitlement": a sense that those benefits that white men believed were their due have been snatched away from them.

Angry White Men discusses, among others, the sons of small town America, scarred by underemployment and wage stagnation. When America’s white men feel they’ve lived their lives the ‘right’ way – worked hard and stayed out of trouble – and still do not get economic rewards, then they have to blame somebody else. Even more terrifying is the phenomenon of angry young boys. School shootings in the United States are not just the work of “misguided youth” or “troubled teens”—they’re all committed by boys. These alienated young men are transformed into mass murderers by a sense that using violence against others is their right.

The future of America is more inclusive and diverse. The choice for angry white men is not whether or not they can stem the tide of history: they cannot. Their choice is whether or not they will be dragged kicking and screaming into that inevitable future, or whether they will walk openly and honorably – far happier and healthier incidentally – alongside those they’ve spent so long trying to exclude.

First up, the review from Rosin at the New York Times, a sympathetic response, although she concludes that the real issues with the men in this book are class issues more than gender or race issues. I think she's right, and many men (and women) don't get that men are just as oppressed in this country as are women, it just looks very different because many men have bought into their oppression.

Even Madder Men: ‘Angry White Men,’ by Michael Kimmel
By HANNA ROSIN
Published: November 22, 2013

The characters populating Michael Kimmel’s new book, “Angry White Men,” are familiar types: Rush Limbaugh’s ditto­heads, neo-Nazis, wife beaters, rampaging shooters and the divorced rageaholics of the men’s rights movement. Crowded together under one banner, they make for a scary and unpleasant lot: full of fury and blaming everyone but themselves for their problems. Mostly, they blame women: ex-wives, would-be girlfriends, the phantom black women who stole their jobs. The editor of a men’s rights website proclaims, “The real question here is not whether these women deserve the business end of a right hook, they obviously do, and some of them deserve one hard enough to leave them in an unconscious, innocuous pile on the ground.” 

ANGRY WHITE MEN: American Masculinity at the End of an Era

By Michael Kimmel
314 pp. Nation Books. $26.99.

Kimmel, a sociologist at Stony Brook University in New York, is unusually adventurous for an academic. As he did in his last book, “Guyland: The Perilous World Where Boys Become Men,” here, he ventures into unfamiliar territory and finds himself engaged in the kinds of conversations he is unlikely to have at department meetings. At a gun show in Shippensburg, Pa., Kimmel passes time with a guy he calls “Rick,” who mans the K.K.K. table and says what you would imagine such a person would say about the black man in the White House. At a batterer’s intervention group, Kimmel gets into the action, prodding one man who had hit his wife by asking, “Well, why didn’t you just pick up a knife and stab” her?

A longtime feminist, Kimmel maintains a delicate balance when handling his sources. He wants to be sympathetic to the people he interviews and yet loyal to his academic principles. After a series of humbling recessions and other economic shifts, men like Rick feel emasculated and humiliated, he writes, “betrayed by the country they love, discarded like trash on the side of the information superhighway.” Their sin, according to Kimmel, is a failure to adjust. These guys refuse to admit they’ve been handed privilege all these years by a world that puts white men on top. White men, he writes, “have been running with the wind at our backs all these years,” and “what we think of as ‘fairness’ to us has been built on the backs of others.”

Failing to concede this, men get stuck in a permanent dysfunction Kimmel calls “aggrieved entitlement,” in which they “refuse to even be dragged kicking and screaming into that inevitable future” of greater gender and racial equality. Instead they rage, not at the corporate overlords who have actually shipped their jobs overseas but at the amorphous feminists, or more likely “feminazis,” who have stolen American manhood.

Sometimes it’s difficult to tell how mainstream a phenomenon Kimmel is describing. In one chapter he recounts the case of George Sodini, a 48-year-old who went to his gym and shot dead five women (and then himself) because, as he wrote in an online diary, “I dress good, am clean shaven, bathe, touch of cologne — yet 30 million women rejected me.” Sodini, Kimmel writes, has “legions of fans” on men’s rights websites, people who call him a “hero” for standing up to all the “freeloading” women out there. But are these fringe lunatics or, as Kimmel labels them, an army of “everyday Sodinis” who beat and batter women with abandon? After all, rates of nonfatal violent victimization of women have dropped significantly since the 1990s, according to a 2011 White House report on women and girls. Visible rage may be increasing, but most men may feel impotent to act on it, or may be adjusting in more ways than we realize.

In one fascinating chapter Kimmel explores the changing nature of school violence. Once the scourge of urban black institutions, this phenomenon has taken on new form in suburban and rural neighborhoods. The school shooter is now pretty much always male and usually white (Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech shooter, being an exception, although Kimmel asserts that he had much in common with the Columbine killers and others). Kimmel makes a convincing case that this shift has to do with a sense of aggrieved entitlement, showing how these boys spent a lot of time fending off insults to their masculinity from the “jockocracy” that ruled their schools. But Kimmel also strains a little too hard for a tidy sociological explanation, arguing mightily (and pointlessly) against the idea that these attackers were singularly deranged or psychotic. Like the suicide bombers he compares them to, one can be both uniquely psychologically vulnerable, a total outlier, and yet tuned in to a broader cultural trend.

Kimmel’s balance of critical distance and empathy works best in his chapter on the fathers’ rights movement, a subset of the men’s rights movement. Members of this group are generally men coming out of bitter divorce proceedings who believe the courts cheated them out of the chance to be close to their children. They exhibit some of the wrath and obsessive qualities of other angry white men, routinely refer to their ex-wives in the nastiest ways and tend to overstate their involvement in family life. (As one child reported to a custody evaluator, his dad didn’t spend a lot of time with him “because he’s always busy working on his fathers’ organization.”) That said, their grievances are based on a legitimate insight. Often, Kimmel writes, family court judges act as if “they’re adjudicating Don and Betty Draper’s divorce,” back in the 1960s. They fail to recognize that fathers these days do a lot more child care than they used to, that mothers should not always be the default caretakers, and that fathers often want to remain an active presence in their child’s lives, as something beyond a steady paycheck — ​an­other sign that many men are in fact getting used to a new world order.

Outside a more elite audience, Kimmel’s diagnosis of aggrieved entitlement will be, I imagine, a tough sell. The men he’s writing about have gone through several recessions and 40 years of economic shifts. They live in a world where, as one man tells him, you’ll never find a job as a plumber but you might find one as a Walmart hostess. Beyond that, families around them are falling apart. Among men like them, without a college degree, divorce rates are high and fewer people get married; for women with only a high school degree, for example, nearly 60 percent of births occur outside marriage, rendering fatherhood a relic of the past. These men may have once run with the wind at their backs, but the air has been dead still for a long time.

Kimmel’s hope is that more men will give up their sense of entitlement and accept a gentler, fairer notion of what it means to be a man. That’s the right ­ideal, and pop culture has been helping him along, providing ever more TV shows portraying working-class men as loving fathers. Kimmel’s own book, too, offers evidence that men are making adjustments, choosing to be active parents or attending batterer support groups in an effort to change.

But in the short term, class inequalities loom larger than gender or race. You won’t easily convince Rick or the other men in the book that, due to the long arc of male privilege over the course of world history, he owes something to the likes of Barack Obama or Sheryl Sandberg, or to a sociology professor who lives in New York.
~ Hanna Rosin is the author, most recently, of “The End of Men: And the Rise of Women.”

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: December 29, 2013A review on Nov. 24 about “Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era,” by Michael Kimmel, misspelled the surname of the man who shot 32 people to death at Virginia Tech in 2007. He was Seung-Hui Cho , not Choi.

* * * * *

This piece is from Salon, an excerpt from Angry White Men that focuses on the white supremacists as the angriest of the angry white men.

America’s angriest white men: Up close with racism, rage and Southern supremacy

Up close with small-town white rage, with bitter, scary men who feel left behind by economic and cultural change

Michael Kimmel
Sunday, Nov 17, 2013 

Excerpted from Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era

Who are the white supremacists? There has been no formal survey, for obvious reasons, but there are several noticeable patterns. Geographically, they come from America’s heartland—small towns, rural cities, swelling suburban sprawl outside larger Sunbelt cities. These aren’t the prosperous towns, but the single-story working-class exurbs that stretch for what feels like forever in the corridor between Long Beach and San Diego (not the San Fernando Valley), or along the southern tier of Pennsylvania, or spread all through the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, across the vast high plains of eastern Washington and Oregon, through Idaho and Montana. There are plenty in the declining cities of the Rust Belt, in Dearborn and Flint, Buffalo and Milwaukee, in the bars that remain in the shadows of the hulking deserted factories that once were America’s manufacturing centers. And that doesn’t even touch the former states of the Confederacy, where flying the Confederate flag is a culturally approved symbol of “southern pride”—in the same way that wearing a swastika would be a symbol of German “heritage” (except it’s illegal in Germany to wear a swastika).

There’s a large rural component. Although “the spread of far-right groups over the last decade has not been limited to rural areas alone,” writes Osha Gray Davidson, “the social and economic unraveling of rural communities—especially in the midwest—has provided far-right groups with new audiences for their messages of hate. Some of these groups have enjoyed considerable success in their rural campaign.” For many farmers facing foreclosures, the Far Right promises to help them save their land have been appealing, offering farmers various schemes and legal maneuvers to help prevent foreclosures, blaming the farmers’ troubles on Jewish bankers and the one-world government. “As rural communities started to collapse,” Davidson writes, the Far Right “could be seen at farm auctions comforting families . . . confirming what rural people knew to be true: that their livelihoods, their families, their communities—their very lives—were falling apart.” In stark contrast to the government indifference encountered by rural Americans, a range of Far Right groups, most recently the militias, have seemingly provided support, community, and answers.

In that sense, the contemporary militias and other white supremacist groups are following in the footsteps of the Ku Klux Klan, the Posse Comitatus, and other Far Right patriot groups who recruited members in rural America throughout the 1980s. They tap into a long history of racial and ethnic paranoia in rural America, as well as an equally long tradition of collective local action and vigilante justice. There remains a widespread notion that “Jews, African-Americans, and other minority-group members ‘do not entirely belong,’” which may, in part, “be responsible for rural people’s easy acceptance of the far right’s agenda of hate,” writes Matthew Snipp. “The far right didn’t create bigotry in the Midwest; it didn’t need to,” Davidson concludes. “It merely had to tap into the existing undercurrent of prejudice once this had been inflamed by widespread economic failure and social discontent.”

And many have moved from their deindustrializing cities, foreclosed suburban tracts, and wasted farmlands to smaller rural areas because they seek the companionship of like-minded fellows, in relatively remote areas far from large numbers of nonwhites and Jews and where they can organize, train, and build protective fortresses. Many groups have established refuge in rural communities, where they can practice military tactics, stockpile food and weapons, hone their survivalist skills, and become self-sufficient in preparation for Armageddon, the final race war, or whatever cataclysm they envision. Think of it as the twenty-first-century version of postwar suburban “white flight”—but on steroids.

They’re certainly Christian, but not just any Christian—they’re evangelical Protestant, Pentacostalist, and members of radical sects that preach racial purity as the Word of Jesus. (Catholicism is certainly stocked with conservatives on social issues, but white supremacists tap into such a long and ignoble tradition of anti-Catholicism that they tend to have their own right-wing organizations, mostly fighting against women’s rights and gay rights.) Some belong to churches like the Christian Identity Church, which gained a foothold on the Far Right in the early 1980s. Christian Identity’s focus on racism and anti-Semitism provides the theological underpinnings to the shift from a more “traditional agrarian protest” to paramilitarism. It is from the Christian Identity movement that the Far Right gets its theological claims that Adam is the ancestor of the Caucasian race, whereas non-whites are pre-Adamic “mud people,” without souls, and Jews are the children of Satan. According to this doctrine, Jesus was not Jewish and not from the Middle East; actually, he was northern European, his Second Coming is close at hand, and followers can hasten the apocalypse. It is the birthright of Anglo-Saxons to establish God’s kingdom on earth; America’s and Britain’s “birthright is to be the wealthiest, most powerful nations on earth . . . able, by divine right, to dominate and colonize the world.”

A large proportion of the extreme right wing are military veterans. Several leaders served in Vietnam and were shocked at the national disgust that greeted them as they returned home after that debacle. “America’s failure to win that war was a truly profound blow,” writes William J. Gibson. “If Americans were no longer winners, then who were they?” Some veterans believed they were sold out by the government, caving in to effeminate cowardly protesters; they can no longer trust the government to fight for what is right. Bo Gritz, a former Green Beret in Vietnam, returned to Southeast Asia several times in clandestine missions to search for prisoners of war and was the real-life basis for the film Rambo. He uses his military heroism to increase his credibility among potential recruits; one brochure describes him as “this country’s most decorated Vietnam veteran” who “killed some 400 Communists in his illustrious military career.” In 1993 Gritz began a traveling SPIKE (Specially Prepared Individuals for Key Events) training program, a rigorous survival course in paramilitary techniques.

Many of the younger guys are veterans of the first Gulf War, a war that they came to believe was fought for no moral principles at all, but simply to make America’s oil supply safer and to protect Israel from possible Arab attack. They feel they’ve been used, pawns in a larger political game, serving their country honorably only to be spit out and stepped on when they returned home to slashed veteran benefits, bureaucratic indifference to post-traumatic stress disorder, and general social contempt for having fought in the war in the first place. They believed they were entitled to be hailed as heroes, as had earlier generations of American veterans, not to be scorned as outcasts. Now a guy like Bo Gritz symbolizes “true” warrior-style masculinity, and reclaiming their manhood is the reward for signing up with the Far Right.

THE CLASS ORIGINS OF RACIAL POLITICS

Perhaps what binds them all together, though, is class. Rural or small town, urban or suburban, the extreme Right is populated by downwardly mobile, lower-middle-class white men. All of the men I interviewed—all—fitted this class profile. When I compared with other ethnographies and other surveys, they all had the same profile as well.

In the United States, class is often a proxy for race. When politicians speak of the “urban poor,” we know it’s a code for black people. When they talk about “welfare queens,” we know the race of that woman driving the late-model Cadillac. In polite society, racism remains hidden behind a screen spelled CLASS.

On the extreme Right, by contrast, race is a proxy for class. Among the white supremacists, when they speak of race consciousness, defending white people, protesting for equal rights for white people, they actually don’t mean all white people. They don’t mean Wall Street bankers and lawyers, though they are pretty much entirely white and male. They don’t mean white male doctors, or lawyers, or architects, or even engineers. They don’t mean the legions of young white hipster guys, or computer geeks flocking to the Silicon Valley, or the legions of white preppies in their boat shoes and seersucker jackets “interning” at white-shoe law firms in major cities. Not at all. They mean middle-and working-class white people. Race consciousness is actually class consciousness without actually having to “see” class. “Race blindness” leads working-class people to turn right; if they did see class, they’d turn left and make common cause with different races in the same economic class.

That’s certainly what I found among them. Most are in their mid-thirties to early forties, educated at least through high school and often beyond. (The average age of the guys I talked with was thirty-six.) They are the sons of skilled workers in industries like textiles and tobacco, the sons of the owners of small farms, shops, and grocery stores. Buffeted by global political and economic forces, the sons have inherited little of their fathers’ legacies. The family farms have been lost to foreclosure, the small shops squeezed out by Walmarts and malls. These young men face a spiral of downward mobility and economic uncertainty. They complain that they are squeezed between the omnivorous jaws of global capital concentration and a federal bureaucracy that is at best indifferent to their plight and at worst complicit in their demise.

And they’re right. It is the lower middle class—that strata of independent farmers, small shopkeepers, craft and highly skilled workers, and small-scale entrepreneurs—that has been hit hardest by globalization. “Western industry has displaced traditional crafts—female as well as male—and large-scale multinational-controlled agriculture has downgraded the independent farmer to the status of hired hand,” writes journalist Barbara Ehrenreich. This has resulted in massive male displacement—migration, downward mobility. It has been felt the most not by the adult men who were the tradesmen, shopkeepers, and skilled workers, but by their sons, by the young men whose inheritance has been seemingly stolen from them. They feel entitled and deprived—and furious. These angry young men are the foot soldiers of the armies of rage that have sprung up around the world.

What’s important to note is that they are literally the sons. It was their fathers who closed the family store, who lost the family farm. Some are men who have worked all their adult lives, hoping to pass on the family farm to their sons and retire comfortably. They believed that if they worked hard, their legacy would be ensured, but they leave their sons little but a legacy of foreclosures, economic insecurity, and debt.

It was their status next to their father’s and grandfather’s names on the cabinetmaking storefront that said “Jones and Sons.” These were businesses that came not only with the ability to make a living, but came with dignity, with a sense of craft pride, a sense that you owned your own store or farm, owned and controlled your own labor—even employed some other people—and that this economic autonomy had been a source of great pride in the family for generations. In a near-throwaway footnote in his classic study of identity development, Childhood and Society (1950), Erik Erikson locates the origins of young men’s anger in a multigenerational story:

In psychoanalytic patients the overwhelming importance of the grandfather is often apparent. He may have been a blacksmith of the old world or a railroad builder of the new, and as yet proud Jew or an unreconstructed Southerner. What these grandfathers have in common is that fact that they were the last representatives of a more homogeneous world, masterly and cruel with good conscience, disciplined and pious without loss of self-esteem. Their world invented bigger and better machinery like gigantic playthings which were not expected to challenge the social values of the men who made them. Their mastery persists in their grandsons as a stubborn, an angry sense of superiority. Overtly inhibited, they yet can accept others only on terms of prearranged privilege.

“It wasn’t my daddy’s farm,” said Andy, “it was my granddaddy’s, and his daddy’s, and his daddy’s. Five generations of Hoosier farmers.” Generations of Hoosier men, who worked the farm, supported a family, made a living with dignity. They proved their masculinity in that most time-honored way in America: as family providers. And it was their fathers who lost it all, squandered their birthright. Instead of getting angry at their fathers, Andy and his comrades claim the mantle of the grandfathers, displace their rage outward, onto an impermeable and unfeeling government bureaucracy that didn’t offer help, onto soulless corporations that squeezed them mercilessly. By displacing their anger onto those enormous faceless entities, the sons justify their political rage and rescue their own fathers from their anger.

Some can’t do it. Some of the sons—and the fathers—turn their rage inward. We have already discussed the wave of suicides that rippled across the American heartland in the 1980s and 1990s—spawning widespread concern and a series of Farm Aid concerts to raise awareness. The number of suicides in America’s Midwest was higher in the 1990s than during the Great Depression; suicide was the leading cause of agricultural fatalities for two decades—by far. Men were five times more likely to kill themselves than die by accident. “To fail several generations of relatives (both backwards and forwards into those unborn descendants who will now not be able to farm), to see yourself as the one weak link in a strong chain that spans more than a century, is a terrible, and for some, an unbearable burden,” writes Osha Gray Davidson. “When a fellow in a steel mill loses his job, he has basically lost his paycheck,” a physician at the University of Iowa explained. “When an Iowa farmer loses his farm, he’s lost the guts of his life.”

One woman, speaking at a town meeting in Tonkawa, Oklahoma, in 1991, provided an eloquent narrative of this process:

I am a 46-year-old mother of three children. We have lost two farms since 1980, my mother in law’s farm as well as our own. We were forced to sell 160 acres of land that was very special to us. It was homesteaded by my husband’s great grandfather and for years had served as home to our cow and calf operation which we were forced to sell just a few months before we sold the land.

My husband became completely consumed by our circumstances caused by the farm crisis. He left me. Our family continued to deteriorate and our marriage ended in divorce. We had been through natural crises before—drought, flood, crop failure—these we accepted and went on.

But when the threat of losing everything comes to your doorstep because of the bad economy, low commodity prices and high interest on your base notes has left you hopelessly in debt, your faith is sometimes shaken. No one likes to consider that their life has been pointless.

Others direct this seething rage outward. “Many debt ridden farm families will become more suspicious of government, as their self-worth, their sense of belonging, their hope for the future deteriorates,” predicted Oklahoma psychologist Glen Wallace presciently in 1989. “The farms are gone,” writes Dyer, “yet the farmers remain. They’ve been transformed into a wildfire of rage, fueled by the grief of their loss and blown by the winds of conspiracy and hate-filled rhetoric.” “It is hardly surprising, then, that American men—lacking confidence in the government and the economy, troubled by the changing relations between the sexes, uncertain of their identity or their future—began to dream, to fantasize about the powers and features of another kind of man who could retake and reorder the world. And the hero of all these dreams was the paramilitary warrior.” The contemporary white supremacist movement is the embodiment of these warrior dreams.

Their plan is to get even. Unlike Joe Wesbecker, some guys don’t just get even by rampaging through their factory floor or their corporate offices, shooting at their former colleagues and coworkers. They get mad, and they get organized. They cobble together a theory that explains their plight—grafting together fringe elements of evangelical Christianity, traditional anti-Semitism and racism, and general right-wing paranoia into an amalgam that is loosely held together by a nostalgic vision of hardy, independent frontier manhood. Like the guys who go postal, they externalize their rage—their anguish is clearly the fault of someone else—but they don’t externalize it to their immediate surroundings, their boss, supervisor, or coworkers. Instead, it’s larger, more powerful, and pernicious social forces—Jews, Muslims, minorities generally, women.

These are the sons of small-town America, the Jeffersonian yeoman of the nineteenth century, disfigured by global restructuring and economic downturns. They come from the “large and growing number of US citizens disaffected from and alienated by a government that seems indifferent, if not hostile, to their interests. This predominantly white, male, and middle-and working-class sector has been buffeted by global economic restructuring with its attendant job losses, declining real wages, and social dislocations. While under economic stress, this sector has also seen its traditional privileges and status challenged by 1960s-style social movements, such as feminism, minority rights, and environmentalism.”

The sons of these farmers and shopkeepers expected to—and felt entitled to—inherit their fathers’ legacy. And when it became evident it was not going to happen, they became murderously angry—at a system that emasculated their fathers and threatens their manhood. They live in what they call a “Walmart economy” and are governed by a “nanny state” that doles out their birthright to ungrateful and undeserving immigrants. What they want, says one guy, is to “take back what is rightfully ours.”

*

So, who are they really, these hundred thousand white supremacists? They’re every white guy who believed that this land was his land, was made for you and me. They’re every down-on-his-luck guy who just wanted to live a decent life but got stepped on, every character in a Bruce Springsteen or Merle Haggard song, every cop, soldier, auto mechanic, steelworker, and construction worker in America’s small towns who can’t make ends meet and wonders why everyone else is getting a break except him. But instead of becoming Tom Joad, a left-leaning populist, they take a hard right turn, ultimately supporting the very people who have dispossessed them.

They’re America’s Everymen, whose pain at downward mobility and whose anger at what they see as an indifferent government have become twisted by a hate that tells them they are better than others, disfigured by a resentment so deep that there are no more bridges to be built, no more ladders of upward mobility to be climbed, a howl of pain mangled into the scream of a warrior. Their rage is as sad as it is frightening, as impotent as it is shrill.

WALKING THE PATRIOTIC CAPITALIST TIGHTROPE

You might think that the political ideology of the white supremacist movement is as simple as their list of enemies: put down minorities, expel immigrants, push the women out of the workplace, and round up and execute the gays and the Jews. But it’s not nearly so simple. Actually, they have to navigate some treacherous ideological waters and reconcile seemingly contradictory ideological visions with their emotions.

There are three parts to their ideological vision. For one thing, they are ferociously procapitalist. They are firm believers in the free market and free enterprise. They just don’t like what it’s brought. They like capitalism; they just hate corporations. They identify, often, as the vast middle class of office workers and white-collar employees, even though that is hardly their class background. (They’ve a fungible understanding of class warfare.) “For generations, white middle class men defined themselves by their careers, believing that loyalty to employers would be rewarded by job security and, therefore, the ability to provide for their families” is the way one issue of Racial Loyalty (a racist skinhead magazine) puts it. “But the past decade—marked by an epidemic of takeovers, mergers, downsizings and consolidations—has shattered that illusion.”

Aryans support capitalist enterprise and entrepreneurship, even those who make it rich, but especially the virtues of the small proprietor, but are vehemently antiurban, anticosmopolitan, and anticorporate. In their eyes, Wall Street is ruled by Jewish-influenced corporate plutocrats who hate “real” Americans. Theirs is the Jeffersonian vision of a nation of producers—not financiers, not bankers, and not those other “masters of the universe” whose entire careers consist of cutting the cake ever more finely and living on the crumbs. It’s Andrew Jackson’s producerist attack on the “parasitic” bankers. It is “the desire to own small property, to produce crops and foodstuffs, to control local affairs, to be served but never coerced by a representative government, and to have traditional ways of life and labor respected,” writes historian Catherine Stock.

White supremacists see themselves as squeezed between global capital and an emasculated state that supports voracious global profiteering. In the song “No Crime Being White,” Day of the Sword, a popular racist skinhead band, confronts the greedy class:

The birthplace is the death of our race.
Our brothers being laid off is a truth we have to face.
Take my job, it’s equal opportunity
The least I can do, you were so oppressed by me
I’ve only put in twenty years now.
Suddenly my country favors gooks and spicks and queers.
Fuck you, then, boy I hope you’re happy when your new employees are the reason why your business ends.

Second, the extreme Right is extremely patriotic. They love their country, their flag, and everything it stands for. These are the guys who get teary at the playing of the national anthem, who choke up when they hear the word America. They have bumper stickers on their pick ups that show the flag with the slogan “These colors don’t run.”

The problem is that the America they love doesn’t happen to be the America in which they live. They love America—but they hate its government. They believe that the government has become so un-American that it has joined in global institutions that undermine and threaten the American way of life. Many fuse critiques of international organizations such as the United Nations with protectionism and neoisolationism, arguing that all internationalisms are part of a larger Zionist conspiracy. Some embrace a grand imperial vision of American (and other Aryan) domination and the final subjugation of “inferior races.”

As he traveled through the rural West, journalist Joel Dyer constantly heard these refrains: “Environmentalists wouldn’t let me run my cows cause some damn little sparrow they said was endangered lived on my place,” “They took my farm,” “The IRS took everything I owned.” “These people believe the government is responsible for where they are, because they are finding themselves ignored, basically, by the economic system. People are losing their homes, their farms, their jobs, their sources of income. Corporations have been allowed to move wherever they want, and to take away jobs by the truckload. People are becoming economically dispossessed.”

NAFTA took away American jobs; what they see as the “Burger King” economy leaves no room at the top, so “many youngsters see themselves as being forced to compete with nonwhites for the available minimum wage, service economy jobs that have replaced their parents’ unionized industry opportunities.”

That such ardent patriots are so passionately antigovernment might strike the observer as contradictory. After all, are these not the same men who served their country in Vietnam or in the Gulf War? Are these not the same men who believe so passionately in the American Dream? Are they not the backbone of the Reagan Revolution? Indeed, they are. The extreme Right faces the difficult cognitive task of maintaining their faith in America and in capitalism and simultaneously providing an analysis of an indifferent state, at best, or an actively interventionist one, at worst, and a way to embrace capitalism, despite a cynical corporate logic that leaves them, often literally, out in the cold—homeless, jobless, hopeless.

Finally, they believe themselves to be the true heirs of the real America. They are the ones who are entitled to inherit the bounty of the American system. It’s their birthright—as native-born, white American men. As sociologist Lillian Rubin puts it, “It’s this confluence of forces—the racial and cultural diversity of our new immigrant population; the claims on the resources of the nation now being made by those minorities who, for generations, have called America their home; the failure of some of our basic institutions to serve the needs of our people; the contracting economy, which threatens the mobility aspirations of working class families—all these have come together to leave white workers feeling as if everyone else is getting a piece of the action while they get nothing.”

This persistent reversal—white men as victim, the “other” as undeservedly privileged—resounds through the rhetoric of the extreme Right. Take, for example, Pat Buchanan’s “A Brief for Whitey,” a response to candidate Barack Obama’s call for a national conversation about race in America: “It is the same old con, the same old shakedown. America has been the best country on earth for black folks. It was here that 600,000 black people, brought from Africa in slave ships, grew into a community of 40 million, were introduced to Christian salvation, and reached the greatest levels of freedom and prosperity blacks have ever known.”

And now, I suppose, Buchanan would say, we’re supposed to apologize to them? Pay them reparations? They should be kissing our feet with gratitude! But no. We live in a fun-house version of America, Buchanan argues, where minorities rule and white folks are the new oppressed minority. It was ours, but it’s not anymore. It has been taken—because we let it! And the fact that it has been stolen from us leaves white American men feeling emasculated—and furious.

It is through a decidedly gendered and sexualized rhetoric of masculinity that this contradiction between loving America and hating its government, loving capitalism and hating its corporate iterations, is resolved. Racism, nativism, anti-Semitism, antifeminism—these discourses of hate provide an explanation for the feelings of entitlement thwarted, fixing the blame squarely on “others” whom the state must now serve at the expense of white men. The unifying theme is gender.

These men feel emasculated by big money and big government. In their eyes, most white American men collude in their emasculation. They’ve grown soft, feminized, weak. White supremacist websites abound with complaints about the “whimpering collapse of the blond male,” the “legions of sissies and weaklings, of flabby, limp-wristed, non-aggressive, non-physical, indecisive, slack-jawed, fearful males who, while still heterosexual in theory and practice, have not even a vestige of the old macho spirit.”

Excerpted from Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era by Michael Kimmel. Published by Nation Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group. Copyright © 2013 by Michael Kimmel. All rights reserved.

More Michael Kimmel.

Omnivore - Notions of Manhood

From Bookforum's Omnivore blog, here is a collection of links related to being a man, including an interesting article on the relation between upper body strength and support for income redistribution.

The researchers collected data on bicep size, socioeconomic status, and support for economic redistribution from hundreds of people in the United States, Argentina, and Denmark. 

In line with their hypotheses, the data revealed that wealthy men with high upper-body strength were less likely to support redistribution, while less wealthy men of the same strength were more likely to support it. 

"Despite the fact that the United States, Denmark and Argentina have very different welfare systems, we still see that -- at the psychological level -- individuals reason about welfare redistribution in the same way," says Petersen. "In all three countries, physically strong males consistently pursue the self-interested position on redistribution." 

Men with low upper-body strength, on the other hand, were less likely to support their own self-interest. Wealthy men of this group showed less resistance to redistribution, while poor men showed less support. 

"Our results demonstrate that physically weak males are more reluctant than physically strong males to assert their self-interest -- just as if disputes over national policies were a matter of direct physical confrontation among small numbers of individuals, rather than abstract electoral dynamics among millions," says Petersen.

Based on my own life, I would guess that I fit into their model - I have greater than average upper body strength, middle class income, and I tend to support a more equitable distribution of wealth. But is that based on my upper body strength, or is it based on my moral and ethical beliefs?

There are also articles on feminist men and why men should align with feminists against sexism.

Notion of manhood 

JUN 10 2013
1:00PM

• From Lip, we know what Plato thought about feminist men, but that was some 2000 years ago — how should we think about it today? 
• Men's upper-body strength predicts their political opinions on economic redistribution, according to new research. 
• A huge study involving over 12,000 participants across 51 cultures from Argentina to Uganda has concluded that men tend to have more varied personalities than women. 
• When men experience sexism: There are some practices and policies that are unfair to men — but this fact should unite men with feminists, not drive them apart. 
• How society’s notion of manhood leads to murder: Diane Anderson-Minshall interviews David McConnell, author of American Honor Killings: Desire and Rage Among Men. 
• Joan Williams on how class anxiety and masculinity fears push men to work longer hours: A work culture in which long hours signal value and status is bad for everyone. 
• If men need a 21st-century role model, how about Jesus Christ?

Peter Lawler & Nina Easton - Perspectives on the Economic Struggles of Men

In his column at Big Think, Peter Lawler breaks down an article from CNN Money on why men are falling behind economically. First the original article and then the response from Lawler.

6 reasons why men are falling behind women

Readers weigh in with their personal observations about why American men are struggling economically

By Nina Easton, senior editor
May 8, 2013

FORTUNE -- There is a growing consensus among scholars on the right, left, and center that the state of median-income men in America is in distress.

They've endured a three-decade drop in earnings. Even before the financial crash, prime-age men were dropping out of the workforce altogether, and the problem has only worsened since. Meanwhile, women are far outstripping their male counterparts in the area that's most important for a 21st century global economy -- education.

The big question remains -- why? On this, the research still falls short. So the outpouring of reader feedback on my column in the April 29 issue of Fortune -- "America's Wayward Sons: Why They Can't Carry On" -- offers some valuable on-the-ground perspective.

The focus of that column was an MIT study showing the sharp rise in single-parent households hurts boys more than girls. Other scholars have blamed a rise in more readily available government assistance, making aid checks more appealing than paychecks. The decline of well-paying manufacturing jobs, combined with fast-paced technological change, also factors in.

Here's what readers, reporting on what they see in their own backyards, had to say:

Flight of fathers. There was broad agreement with the MIT study's conclusion that the rise of single-parenting has set back achievement levels. "My father was a small-time white-collar criminal that fled the country prior to a court date when I was just a few months old," Adam C. Dudly writes. "Even now, in my 30s, I struggle with laziness, sense of identity issues, figuring out who I am or what I want to be, and what kind of man I'm supposed to be ... I would have to assume most young men are not as proactive as I am."

"While this may seem glamorous for those who admire movie stars and athletes, such family arrangements in the real world often doom children to lead lives of emotional and material privation," writes Jason DeSena Trennart. "It is a clear and present danger to the fabric of our republic. Senator Moynihan spoke honestly about this problem in the African American community as long ago as 1965. Sadly, the phenomenon of single-parent households has only grown."

A rise in autism and ADHD. "Unfortunately, the current debate is being waged by social scientists and psychologists who are quick to blame the issue on vague societal trends (globalization, decline in manufacturing) and of course, single mothers and the lack of a male role model," writes Michelle Linn. "I suggest you consider exploring how biological (real) science may be playing a role in this alarming issue. The generation of children born since 1988 are by many accounts the unhealthiest on record. The rates of ADHD, asthma, autism, bipolar disorder, diabetes, and allergies have skyrocketed in the last two decades. In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control published a rate of 1 in 5 children having a behavioral disorder or chronic disease.

"It is well known that neurological disorders affect boys more frequently than girls (for autism, the rate is fivefold)," she continues. "Could it be these illnesses and diseases of the central nervous system are actually affecting our economy? It is very easy to blame the lost potential of up to 20% of our youth on social stereotypes and psychology 101 blithering."

Video games. "As the mother of two boys ages 14 and 15," writes Chris Olofson, "my biggest fear is that it's the video gaming, in addition to the factors you mentioned in your article, that is causing the lack of motivation and initiative to work and thus get a firm hold on the economic ladder.'' She wants to see more research on how video games lead to a decline in reading and thereby college performance.

A K-12 education system biased toward girls. As Rob Ritzenthaler bluntly put it: "Who was the nut that thought that boys should sit at a desk for 6-8 hours a day while they were growing up?" Some readers also criticized the emphasis on obtaining college degrees.

Microbiology professor Pinghui V. Liu cited Japan's system of vocational schools for high school students who can't afford college -- offering engineering and mechanics, commerce and accounting, schools of agriculture and forestry, and even schools of fisheries. With this kind of schooling, teenagers "can start looking for jobs at the age when American students are just beginning to worry about how to pay for their college education," he writes.

Likewise, writes Dave Danson, "the constant message to your our young people that they are going to be a failure in life without a four-year degree is the wrong message to send to parents and young people ... The food in your grocery store was delivered by a trucker who most likely did not have a degree. The store mechanicals are maintained by someone without a degree ... Post-secondary training is vital ... But please try to look at the bigger picture."

Several readers noted that in school, boys and men still outpace women in science and math. And they still dominate in high-paying industrial jobs. Corey Planter, who graduated with a paper-engineering degree, notes that men mostly fill factory jobs as millwrights, pipe fitters, welders, and ironworkers -- paying up to $28 an hour. "You may be thinking that these jobs are rapidly disappearing, however they are not," he writes, noting one machinist shop that was on a nationwide search for enough machinists to keep up with his orders.

The financial gains of women. Gustavo A. Duran makes clear he supports the recent economic gains of women -- his own daughter has a masters from Stanford -- but he sees more and more men taking a backseat. "I am now seeing many women in their 40s being the main breadwinners while their husbands diddle [around] daily in odds and ends," Duran writes. "I think this trend will just get larger as we move on the next two to three decades unless we as a society become more demanding of our male children to be disciplined and accountable ... Men need to be equally responsible for themselves so that they can contribute to taking care of their children and their spouses."

Affirmative action. "I was surprised, however, not to see any mention of affirmative action as a contributor," writes T.J. Wilsson, echoing a number of readers. "With so many major employers obliging 'guidelines' pressuring them to, effectively, discriminate against males ... For example, I read that a major employer in one state had guidelines that some 80% of its newly hired veterinarians be female." Ron Goddard complained that "every step of the way my sons and I were put on notice by corporate America that we were their second choice."

Whatever their perspective, most of the readers who responded wanted more discussion, more research, and more attention to this vital conversation.

* * * * * *

And now the response - and an alternate viewpoint.

Men Fading Badly?

by PETER LAWLER
MAY 10, 2013

Here’s a good article that offers six explanations for why “median-income men in America” are “in distress.” Their incomes are dropping. Lots of “prime-age men” have been “dropping out of the workforce altogether.” Maybe most importantly, men have been disappearing from our institutions of higher education. If our future leaders are to be those who graduate from our colleges in the most serious programs and with the highest levels of achievement, then most of our future leaders will be women.

At my college, which is fairly typical, we've been worried about the “man dearth” for a while now. We can get filled up pretty easily with solid students, but recruiting men is a challenge. We just started up intercollegiate football, which did reduce the “gender gap” for next fall. But everyone knows that that remedy is temporary.

Where are the men who should be in college? The credential of a college degree, of course, is more important than ever, given the “decline of well-paying manufacturing jobs.” Everyone talks about picking up flexible skills and competencies outside the formal academic structure, but it’s not like that’s so easy for the ordinary guy to do. Peter Thiel ain't offering his entreprenurial grants to guys like that.

I’m not talking about my college now: It’s pretty clear that many or most colleges now have a kind a covert affirmative action for men. They’re knocking themselves out looking for them, and (perhaps) they’re compromising standards just a bit on their behalf. But the various schemes just aren’t working that well.

I’m not complaining about having to teach a disproportionate number of women: While I had a good number of really fine male students this spring, there’s no denying that women, in general, are more mature and have better personal discipline at 18 (or 19 or 22). They also have much better social or relational skills, and so they are much better at flattering (someone might say playing) me. Given my self-esteem “issues,” I really appreciate that.

I want to talk about all six causes of the decline of the middle-class man. The somewhat mysterious epidemic of autism is above my pay grade, but I do see it with my own eyes. And then there are video games, which really do cause some young men to exhibit another kind of asocial behavior.

Whatever I might want to do (eventually), I’m just going to put forward for your consideration what might be the most controversial cause.

I call your attention to the “MIT study showing the sharp rise in single-parent households hurts boys more than girls.”

The “flight of fathers,” for one thing, creates “identity issues” for young men. They haven’t been given guidance—or role modeling—about “who I am and what I want to be.” The result is “achievement levels” suffer.

I would add that fewer young men are either being responsible fathers or thinking of themselves as fathers in the near future. Surely one powerful incentive for personal achievement is parenthood. And parenthood isn’t what it should be if the father isn’t present at home and doing his part.

Because most single-parent households are headed up by women, the toll on motherhood just hasn’t been as great. We might even say that moms seem more noble than ever. Maybe one powerful incentive for the personal achievement of women these days is the knowledge that they can’t and shouldn’t rely on men.

So it’s very possible to speculate that the achievement level of our men fades as their participation in genuinely responsible relational life fades. Or at least we can say that the two forms of fading are interdependent.

by PETER LAWLER

It's sad that it took a recession to do this, but it's good that more men are actively involved in raising their children.

Recession Dramatically Increases Number Of Fathers Caring For Children

(Bloomberg News) Jeff VanderHeijden didn’t expect to be a stay-at-home father for his 3-year-old daughter, especially after getting a raise and promotion as a counselor last year at a residential program for troubled teenagers. Two weeks later, he was fired.

That’s when VanderHeijden, 35, of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, joined the growing ranks of U.S. men spending more time caring for a child. One-third of fathers with working wives are now a regular source of care for their children, the result of the depressed economy and large numbers of out-of-work men, the U.S. Census Bureau reported yesterday.

“Certain projects like refinishing the basement kind of had to go on hold, but it really pays off in the long run,” said VanderHeijden, whose wife works as a teacher. “You can’t put a price on a father-daughter relationship.”

The number of dads regularly caring for children under age 15 increased to 32 percent in 2010 from 26 percent in 2002. Among those fathers with preschool-age children, one in five served as the primary caregiver, meaning adults such as VanderHeijden who spend the most time with their child, the census found.

The recession has increased the number of fathers with an active role in child care, a trend that has been growing since at least 1988, said Lynda Laughlin, a family demographer at the Census Bureau.

“The economy hasn’t completely rebounded, particularly for men,” she said. “What did they label it, a ‘mancession?’”

The economic downturn initially had a greater effect on men than women, with males losing more net jobs between December 2007 and May 2011, according to a July report from the Pew Research Center. Men have regained jobs more quickly in the recovery, the Pew study found.

During recessions, fathers spend more time as partial and primary caregivers of children, Laughlin said, partly because unemployment or changes in work hours increase their availability to do so. “It also can reduce available income to pay for child care outside of the home,” she said.

The recession isn’t the only reason. Women are increasingly contributing more to family income than men, and there is a growing desire among men to take part in the lives of their children, according to Ellen Galinsky, president and co-founder of the New York-based Families and Work Institute.

“The good news is that kids are with their fathers more,” Galinsky said. “The bad news is that families are so squeezed economically.”

The new statistics, from the Census Survey of Income and Program Participation, showed that 54 percent of unemployed fathers with a working wife and preschool-age children are primary caregivers, while 17 percent of employed fathers in the same situation fill that role.

Some couples decide that the cost of child care cancels out the income from a lower-wage job, regardless of the recession.

“If I’m making X and my wife is making X plus 10, who do you want making the money?” said Patrick Spillman, 42, of New York, who’s the primary caregiver for his 3-year-old daughter. “It’s a matter of dollars and cents.”

About three years ago, Lance Somerfeld, 38, found there were few resources for fathers like him after he decided to stay at home with his newborn son. He started the NYC Dads Group and watched it grow into 500 men who share ideas for museum trips, classes, play groups and other activities.

Most of the men in the group weren’t laid off. Instead, he said, they have wives who are making more money or are further along in their careers.

“I just see dads wanting to be a part of their kids’ lives,” Somerfeld said.

Sarah Seltzer - 5 Shocking Facts About Gender in America

This article appeared on Alternet a month or so ago - one of the facts that I found disturbing was that so many people still think it is okay for a man to hit his wife. Among men AND women, 16% feel it is okay for a man to hit his wife. Assuming a U.S. population of 300 million, that's 48 million people - including women, which boggles the mind.

16% Think It's OK for a Man to Hit His Wife? 5 Shocking Facts About Gender in America

A new report reveals that some Americans still think it’s okay for a man to hit his wife, the insane wage gap between women of color and white men, and other disturbing trends.

July 11, 2011 | Sarah Seltzer

With the GOP-waged wars on women, middle-class workers and poor families in full swing and steadily whittling away at women’s status in the US, it’s obvious that we have a long way to go in terms of equality of all kinds. But a new report sheds light on some surprising numbers highlighting that imbalance.

Without the right to abortion, or the ability to prevent and prosecute rape, or the ability to support one’s family, a woman cannot be a full human being, a citizen exercising her rights. This is a given. But did you know that many Americans--16 percent--still think it’s okay for a man to hit his wife? And did you know just how massive the wage gap remains between black and Latina women and white men? What about the fact that until recently, it was almost impossible for native American women to file rape charges if they were assaulted on reservations or that we’re positively the worst “developed” country on parental leave, bar none?

The list goes on, thanks to a recently released global report, “Progress of the World’s Women.(pdf), which focuses on the access to justice of women worldwide. The report comes from the dynamic new group, UN Women. Headed by Michele Bachelet, former president of Chile, the group is hopefully a nascent force for accelerating global gender equity. UN Women has released individualized information on all regions, and the North American fact-sheet (pdf link) highlights some fascinating, surprising and disturbing statistics that background our current climate.

Most importantly, when stacked up to other countries worldwide, the facts show that we’re not some pillar of opportunity for women compared to other countries and regions, but rather saddled with our own major problems. As Flavia Dzodan wrote for Tiger Beatdown, “I think this report does a good job at showing that inequalities and injustices are a global problem and that each region faces a unique set of issues, defined by their socio-political and cultural realities...no region in the world is without serious troubles.” Dzodan also makes the apt point that LGBT issues are absent from the report, which is unfortunate given their frequent close link with gender, race and class inequity. Abortion and reproductive health issues are not included in the US fact sheet, either.

Still, there’s a lot to learn about ourselves here.

Here are five of the most shocking facts from the "Progress Women" report pertaining to the USA, and the way they affect the current climate that can only be described as bleak. Read to the bottom for a few slightly more positive trends.

1. Dogged by Violence. This pervasive inequality extends far beyond the pay gap, threatening the physical and legal safety of women of color, and indeed, all women.

The Dominique Strauss-Kahn case has brought the economic, racial and sexual bias that informs the pursuit of justice in rape and domestic violence cases to the fore. And the numbers found by UN Women back up the way the press has reacted to this high-profile case: “Evidence shows that jurors in the USA are especially likely to question the credibility of African American and Latina female witnesses in rape cases.”

One of the most shocking statistics in the report? The public perception of gender violence as sometimes acceptable, within the context of marriage. This is from the report’s language: “In the USA, 16 percent of women and men agree that it is sometimes justifiable for a man to beat his wife.”

Sure, 16 percent is a fairly standard number for representing the lunatic fringe of American culture, but the fact that these respondents willingly admit they think it’s okay certainly sheds a disturbing light on why violence against women remains widespread: “Prevalence surveys in the USA show that 22 percent of women have experienced physical violence, and 8 percent have been targeted for sexual violence in their lifetimes.”

One other element to these statistics that may be lesser-known is the issue of rape against Native American women, which is astoundingly high. Native American women are more than twice as likely as other women to be raped. One of the things compounding the problem was a confusion over judicial jurisdiction: “Crimes committed by non-Native Americans on reservations often went unpunished, due to uncertainty over which jurisdiction applied. This is thought to have contributed to the high levels of rape of Native American women, Progress shows.“ In other words, a culture of impunity existed.

Last year, UN Women notes, the Tribal Law and Order Act was passed, which hopefully will increase centralized coordination and aid women seeking protection and justice.

2. Persistent Pay Gap. We passed Lily Ledbetter, right? So why is this still an issue? Well, the gender pay gap remains at 23 percent in the USA, according to the new fact sheet from UN Women. If that number isn’t dismaying enough, for African American and Latina women, that gap swells to huge proportions: “On average 39 and 48 percent less than white men, respectively.”

Add what’s happening right now--public workers losing their benefits and their right to collectively bargain, layoffs and festering unemployment-- to that number and you get a level of racial and gender stratification that is staggering.

3. Under-Represented in the Justice System. One of the hindrances to women seeking a fair application of the legal system is a lack of women’s representation in that system's hierarchy. While three female Supreme Court justices are certainly a step in the right direction, even that huge stride gives women disproportionately small representation.

Women are under-represented as prosecutors, judges and police officers throughout North America. Statistics cited by UN Women indicate that “data from 40 countries where women are present in the police, reporting of sexual assault increases.”

4. Packed Prisons. As our ballooning prison-industrial complex--and the drug war that feeds its engines--comes into greater focus, it’s worth remembering the women who are caught in the gears of this incarceration machine. A lesser-known fact about US prisons is that we have one of the highest rates of women’s incarceration in the world, UN Women notes. Adding insult to injury, women in prison “are typically young, have low levels of education and have dependent children. Many have histories of substance abuse and violence.”

These are often the women who need help, not incarceration.

5. Miserable Maternity Leave. The United States is the only--that’s right, the one and only--developed country in the entire world that does not offer paid maternity leave. Yes, under Federal Employment law, there has to be maternity leave. But it doesn’t have to be paid. And, the report notes, “The USA is one of only a few developed countries that do not oblige employers to offer paternity leave, which is proven to help encourage a more equitable division of childcare responsibilities.”

As for free daycare, which the report doesn’t even mention, the sensible idea seems laughable given our current obsession with “austerity” and slashing government programs.

A Few Heartening Numbers

The report did have a few interesting, more positive trends to highlight, a counterweight to the areas lagging so terribly.

* Research shows that since the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was passed in the USA in 1994, non-fatal, violent victimizations committed by intimate partners declined by 49 percent.

* Between 1997 and 2010 the proportion of women in the US Congress increased from 11 percent to 17 percent, and a third of ministerial positions are held by women – almost double the world average.

Small steps, but evidence that forward progress is possible.

Read about how we stack up to the world's other regions at progress.unwomen.org

Sarah Seltzer is an associate editor at AlterNet, a staff writer at RH Reality Check and a freelance writer based in New York City. Her work has been published in Jezebel.com and on the websites of the Nation, the Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal. Find her at sarahmseltzer.com.

Tags: Sarah Seltzer, 5 Shocking Facts, Gender in America, Alternet, gender, gender roles, society, economics, government, men, women, race, wage gap, equality, domestic violence, criminal justice system, rape